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The concern of this chapter, as that of the book as a whole, is to explore contemporary 
relationships between Muslim minorities and the state, with a particular focus upon 
structural and cultural dynamics.* In this regard the case of Britain is illustrative. This 
is because an analysiVRISROLWLFDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHVSRQVHVWR0XVOLPµGLIIHUHQFH¶ in 
Britain details a pattern of engagement that has evolved over a  period of time. This 
can be framed in terms of rising agendas of racial equality and multiculturalism to 
which Muslims have become central ± even while they have challenged important 
aspects of these. This implies that these developments have neither been linear nor 
unproblematic, and have been characterised by various ongoing contestations and 
revisions.1 According to some authors, what this engagement has accomplished 
presently looks to be in retreat and at best remains uncertain.2 Indeed, Prime Minister 
Cameron in particular has, since his time in opposition, has characterized British 
PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP DV D µEDUULHU¶ GLYLGLQJ %ULWLVK VRFLHW\  -DQXDU\   
6XEVHTXHQWO\LQRIILFHKHKDVDUJXHGWKDWµWKHGRFWULQHRIµVWDWHPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP¶ has 
encouraged culturally different people to live apart from one another and apart from 
WKHPDLQVWUHDP¶)HEUXDU\3HUKDSVVHHNLQJWRVWDNHRXWD%ULWLVKLeitkultur, 
Cameron has also complained that multiculturalism has led to the minimization of 
Christianity as a guiding pXEOLF HWKRV DQG KDV µDOORZHG segregated communities to 
behave in ways that run completely counter to our values and has not contained that 
H[WUHPLVPEXWDOORZHGLWWRJURZDQGSURVSHU¶3  
  
It is our argument that these sentiments should not obscure several significant ways in 
which Muslim minorities and British citizenship have been cast in dynamic and 
mutually constitutive terms.  Indeed, we suggest that contrary to a popular insistence 
following the 7/7 London bombings and other terrorist incidents involving British 
Muslim protagonists, multiculturalism in Britain has not been erased.4 Indeed, while 
for a while scholars took the rhetorical failure demise of multiculturalism at face 
                                                 
* This chapter reproduces and updates materials from Modood, T, and Meer, N. µ&RQWHPSRUDU\
developments in cases of Muslim-VWDWHHQJDJHPHQW¶LQ$7ULDQdafyllidou (ed.) Muslims in 21st 
Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives. We therefore gratefully acknowledge Routledge 
Publishing.  
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value, this is now being empirically rebutted.5 In this chapter we specifically contend 
that any discussion of Muslim minorities in 21st century Britain must not ignore the 
following developments for they too may affect the course of future state-Muslim 
engagement. In order to substantiate these assertions this chapter will begin with a 
discussion of the sociological and political character of British citizenship, before 
offering an account of the cultures and identities of contemporary British Muslim 
communities. It will then empirically elaborate cases of state-Muslim engagement 
within multiculturalist ± including multi-faith ± arenas, and trace the structural-
cultural dynamics therein.   
 
British Multiculturalism and its Muslims 
 
While there has been a long-established Muslim presence in Britain, particularly 
comprising North African (especially Yemeni) and East Indian sea-faring migrants 
DQGµODVFDUV¶6, the major and most established SDUWRI%ULWDLQ¶V0XVOLPSUHVHQFHLVWKH
outcome of post-war Commonwealth migration. This came from India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, initially in the form of male labour from rural small farm owning 
backgrounds seeking to meet the demands of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, and 
was later joined by families and then more urban and professional South Asian 
Muslim political refugees from Kenya and Uganda. These migrants from former 
colonies and dependent territories entered a socio-political environment that would 
give specific emphasis to managing group relations. As such Britain borrowed 
something from the American experience, but went further in focusing upon how 
society could achieve fair treatment for different groups, something that reaches 
beyond how these groups could blend into society.7 Without DQRIILFLDOµ0XOWLFXOWXUDO
$FW¶RUµ&KDUWHU¶LQWKHZD\RI$XVWUDOLDRU&DQDGD8, Britain rejected the notion that 
the incorporation of migrants should be premised upon an uncompromising cultural 
µDVVLPLODWLRQ¶ ,W GLG VR ZKHQ WKH /DERXU Home Secretary Roy Jenkins9 defined 
LQWHJUDWLRQ DV ³not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity 
accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.´ This 
sentiment tried to address the rights of distinct groups as well as their modes of 
interaction, and so was not merely concerned with the rights of individuals. This is 
how, at the lHYHORI)DYHOO¶VµSKLORVRSKLHVRILQWHJUaWLRQ¶ at least, we might begin to 
characterize the specificity of µBritish multiculturalism.¶10   
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While it is not immediately clear what this actually entailed, it is perhaps easier to 
ascertain that Muslims did not feature explicitly in this early multiculturalist approach 
which treated post-war migrants who arrived as Citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth (CUKC)11, and subsequent British-born generations as ethnic and 
racial ± but not as religious - minorities requiring state support and differential 
treatment to overcome distinctive barriers in their exercise of citizenship. Under the 
remit of several Race-Relations Acts, the state has sought to integrate minorities into 
the labour market and other key arenas of British society through an approach that 
promotes equal access as an example of equality of opportunity. Indeed, it is now over 
30 years since the introduction of a third Race Relations Act (1976) which cemented a 
state sponsorship of Race Equality by consolidating earlier, weaker legislative 
instruments (RRA 1965 & 1968). Alongside its broad remit spanning public and 
private institutions, the recognition of indirect discrimination and the imposition of a 
VWDWXWRU\SXEOLFGXW\WRSURPRWHJRRGµUDFH-UHODWLRQV¶LWDOVRFUHDWHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ
for Racial Equality (CRE) to assist individual complainants and monitor the 
implementation of the Act.12 This is an example, according to Joppke13, of a 
citizenship that has amounted to a ³precarious balance between citizenship 
universalism and racial group particularism [that] stops short of giving special group 
rights to immigrants.´14 Alongside this state-centred and national focus, there is also a 
tradition of what we might characterizH DV µPXQLFLSDO GULIW¶ ZKHUH multiculturalist 
discourses and policies have been pursued though local councils and municipal 
authorities, making up a patchwork of British multicultural public policies in the way 
summarized by Singh.15 
  
Historically, multiculturalism as a public policy in Britain has been heavily localised, 
often made voluntary, and linked essentially to issues of managing diversity in areas 
of immigrant settlement. The legislative framework on which this policy is based ± 
for example, the Race Relations Acts (1965 and 1976) ± recognised this contingency, 
giving additional resources to local authorities as well as new powers to better 
promote racial and ethnic equality. With these enabling powers, most local authorities 
with large ethnic minority populations have transformed themselves from initially 
being the bastions of official racism to being promoters of anti-racism and 
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multiculturalism, and with this change the strength of local ethnic communities and 
coalitions have been instrumental.   
  
Perhaps the best example of 6LQJK¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIORFDOPXOWLFXOWXUDOism is captured 
by the programs of anti-racist education16 and multicultural education (Swann 
Committee 1985) that have historically been enacted at the Local Education Authority 
(LEA) level. LEAs are responsible for education within the jurisdiction of county 
councils and metropolitan boroughs, and this includes responsibility for all state 
VFKRROV ZLWK WKH H[FHSWLRQ RI WKRVH WKDW DSSO\ DQG DUH DIIRUGHG µYROXQWDU\ DLGHG
VWDWXV¶ DQG FDQ WKHUHIRUH RSW RXW XQGHU WKH terms of the 1944 Education Act. As 
6LQJK¶V DFFRXQW LPSOLHV Ln many multi-ethnic urban areas LEAs have actively 
encouraged anti-racist and multicultural initiatives in the face of ± and at the cost of ± 
some vociferous opposition17, and this has in turn informed the national picture.  
Indeed, it was through debates at the local level regarding multicultural education that 
one of the leading public policy documents on multiculturalism arose. Entitled 
Education for All, the Swann Report18 characterised multiculturalism in Britain as 
enabling «Dll ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate in fully 
VKDSLQJ VRFLHW\«ZKLOVW DOVR DOORZLQJ DQG ZKHUH QHFHVVDU\ DVVLVWLQJ WKH HWKQLF
minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within a 
framework of commonly accepted values.   
  
Yet this limited multiculturalism explicitly precluded such things as state support of 
linguistic pluralism (in terms of teaching in ³PRWKHUWRQJXH´as opposed to a language 
like Urdu being an out-of-school subject) or the expansion of religious schools, 
seeking instead to make each matters of private concern. It has taken Muslim 
minorities decades of engagement to begin to expand such multiculturalist approaches 
in a way that also takes their particular needs into account, specifically by contesting 
its secular and narrowly racial focus. ThLVLVDQH[DPSOHRIWKHµPXOWL¶LQ0RGRRG¶V
³PXOWLIDPLO\UHVHPEODQFHV´in so far as different types of group claims, and different 
types of groups labels, may emerge under the purview of multicultural 
accommodations.19 For Muslims in Britain this was perhaps symbolized by the way in 
which the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) developed and emerged as the main 
interlocutor in state-Muslim engagement, and how it achieved some success in 
establishing a Muslim voice in the corridors of power.20 The creation of a religion 
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question on the national Census21, the obtaining of state funding for the first Muslim 
schools22, and more broadly the elicitation of socioeconomic policies targeted at 
severely deprived Muslim groups23 are illustrative examples of these successes. 
Inaugurated in 1997, the MCB is an expanding umbrella organization of presently 
over 450 local, regional and national organizations which elects its secretary-general 
from a central committee. Its genesis lies in the UK Action Committee on Islamic 
Affairs (UKACIA) which developed during the Salman Rushdie affair as the most 
effective means of raising mainstream Muslim voices.24 7KH 0&%¶V VWDWHG DLPV
include the promotion of consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK, giving a 
voice to issues of common concern, addressing discrimination and disadvantages 
IDFHGE\0XVOLPVLQ%ULWDLQHQFRXUDJLQJ³DPRUHHQOLJKWHQHGDSSUHFLDWLRQ´RI,VODP




While initial reformulations of British multiculturalism are important ± especially in 
projecting a symbolic meaning ± they remain comparatively modest when compared 
to the race-equality components of British multiculturalism. It is curious then, given 
the longevity of its ethnic and racial focus, that the fate of multiculturalism in Britain 
should have come to be so intertwined with the political identity of Muslims. This 
intertwining corresponds with how the pre-eminence of the MCB waned in the mid-
2000s as it grew critical of the Iraq War and the so-called War on Terror. It has also 
faced considerable public criticism from both government and civil society bodies 
(particularly of the centre-right) for allegedly failing to reject extremism clearly and 
decisively.26 Indeed, Prime Minister David Cameron has previously likened the MCB 
to the far-right British National Party (BNP).27 Allied to these complaints has been the 
LVVXH RI KRZ µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶ RI %Uitish Muslims the organization actually is ± a 
question that has plagued it since the early days but which has had a more damaging 
impact upon its credibility when joined by a handful of other complaints.28 One 
outcome of this political critique has been the extension to a plethora of other, though 
much less representative, Muslim organizations (such as the Sufi Muslim Council 
(SMC) and the Al-Khoie Foundation) of the invitation to represent British Muslims in 
matters of consultation and stake-holders. At the same time, and as is further 
elaborated below, newer advisory groups (such as the Mosques and Imams National 
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Advisory Body (MINAB)) do not seek the same remit of representation as the MCB, 
while other older bodies such as the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC) continue to be an 
affiliate member of the MCB.      
  
We argue that these developments are linked to at least two further issues. The first is 
that Muslim claims-making has been characterized as specifically ambitious and 
difficult to accommodate.29 This is particularly the case when Muslims are perceived 
to be, often uniquely, in contravention of liberal discourses of individual rights and 
secularism that are made more permeable by concessions implied in multiculturalist 
approaches.30 This is exemplified by the way in which visible Muslim practices such 
as veiling31 have in public discourses been reduced to and conflated with alleged 
Muslim practices such as forced marriages, female genital mutilation, a rejection of 
positive law in favor of criminal SKDU¶LD law and so on. Each suggests a radical 
µRWKHUQHVV¶DERXW0XVOLPVDQGD non-liberality about multiculturalism, and, since the 
latter is alleged to license these practices, opposition to the practice, it is argued, 
necessarily invalidates the policy.32    
  
The second reason derives from global events, and not necessarily from the acts of 
terrorism undertaken by protagonists proclaiming a Muslim agenda (which are 
routinely condemned by leading British-Muslim bodies), but from the subsequent 
conflation of a criminal minority with an assumed tendency inherent to the many.  
Indeed, in a post 9/11 and 7/7 climate, the explanatory purchase of Muslim cultural 
dysfunctionality has generated a profitable discursive economy in accounting for what 
KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVµ,VODPLFWHUURULVP¶.33 The net outcome of these two issues is a 
coupling of diversity and anti-terrorism agendas that has implicated contemporary 
British multiculturalism as the culpULWRI%ULWDLQ¶V VHFXULW\ZRHV Gilles Kepel34, for 
example, has insisted thaW WKH ERPEHUV ³ZHUH WKH FKLOGUHQ RI %ULWDLQ¶V RZQ
PXOWLFXOWXUDO VRFLHW\´ DQG WKDW WKH ERPELQJV KDYH ³smashed´ the implicit social 
consensus and multiculturalism to ³smithereens´. More recently, Prins and 
Salisbury35  have claimed that a misplaced deference to multiculturalism, which failed 
to lay down the line to immigrants, has contributed to a lack of national self-
confidence and a fragmenting society that has been exploited by Islamist terrorists. As 
Modood KDVDUJXHGKRZHYHU³WKHVLPSOLVWLFOLQNDJHEHWween home-grown terrorism 
and the multicultural project is unfair because it ends up blaming not just national 
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policies but specific communLWLHVIRUSDUWLFXODURXWFRPHV´ In this case, Muslims as a 
whole are blamed for terrorism, for not standing up to extremism and for not 
LQWHJUDWLQJ ZKLFK QRW RQO\ DSSHDUV XQIDLU ³EXW DOVR GLYLVLYH DQG VR QRW OLNHO\ WR
achieve the much-sought-for integration.´36 
  
Contemporary Muslim Identity Articulations 
 
At the same time, and whilst Britain has undoubtedly witnessed some securitization of 
ethnic relations, it is not quite the case, as one commentator has suggested, that public 
policy solutions aimed at managing ethnic and religious diversity amount to being 
³tough on mosques, tough on the causes of mosques´.37 To elaborate our argument it 
is necessary to obtain a fuller understanding of the scope and nature of Muslim 
communities and their identifications in contemporary Britain. While Britain is 
certainly diverse, ethnic minority communities are not equally distributed but 
concentrated in England e.g. in 2001, 45% of ethnic minorities resided in Greater 
London (19% of all residents) and another 8% in region South East of London. 13% 
live in the West Midlands (conurbation of Birmingham), 8% in the North West 
(Liverpool, Lancashire), 7% in Yorkshire and Humberside (Newcastle) and 6.3% in 
the East Midlands, mainly Leicester, where they represent a third of the population 
(ONS 2003). While final, thematically organized, data from the 2011 census is yet to 
become available, we know that this will add to the picture of diversity detailed by the 
2001 Census. For example, the 2011 census showed that the ethnic minorities in 
Britain grew from 6.6 million in 2001 to 9.1 million when the census was taken, 
nearly one in six, and that thHUH DUH QRZ D PLOOLRQ µPL[HG-UDFH¶ SHRSOH DQG WKDW
almost 5% of the population in England and Wales self-define as Muslim (second 
after Christianity).38 Based upon data from the earlier decennial census (2001), there 
are well over 1.6 million people in Britain who report an affiliation with Islam by 
voluntarily self-defiQLQJ DV µ0XVOLP¶ This represents 2.9 percent of the entire 
population and makes Islam the most populous faith in Britain after Christianity (72 
percent); more numerous than Hinduism (less than 1 percent, numbering 559,000), 
Sikhism (336,000), Judaism (267,000) and Buddhism (152,000). It is generally 
accepted, however, that the actual number of Muslims is higher because of initial 
undercounting, comparatively higher levels of fertility, and subsequent inward 
migration. Nevertheless, a breakdown of the census data on Muslim constituencies 
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according to ethnicity identifies 42.5 percent of Pakistani ethnic-origin, 16.8 percent 
Bangladeshi, 8.5 percent of Indian, and ± most interestingly ± 7.5 percent of White 
Other. This is largely taken to mean people of Turkish, Arabic and North-African 
ethnic origin who choose the White Other category on the census form. It also 
includes Eastern European Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as white 
Muslims from other European countries and not an insignificant and growing convert 
community (estimated to be over ten thousand in number, see Anwar and Backsh, 
2003). Black-African (6.2) and Other Asian (5.8) census categories dominate the 
remaining ethnic identification options. Even with this heterogeneity, it is still 
understandable ± if a little misleading - that British-Muslims are associated first and 
foremost with a South-Asian background, especially since those with this background 
make up roughly 68 percent of the British Muslim population, have a greater 
longevity in residence, and have been more politically active to date.   
  
Muslims in Britain, as in the world over, are pre-dominantly Sunni, while the majority 
of the single largest group (Pakistanis) are Barelvis; the majority of the remainder are 
Deobandis39. Both these Sunni sects have their origins in the reformist movement set 
in motion by Shah Walliuah that came into existence in post-1857 British India, after 
ZKDWLVFRPPRQO\WHUPHGWKHµ,QGLDQPXWLQ\¶EXWLVEHVWVHHQDV,QGLD¶VILUVWZar of 
independence. Both these groups were concerned with ways of maintaining Islam as a 
living social force in a non-Muslim polity and ruling culture. The Deobandis, taking 
their cue from a school founded in Deoband near Delhi, came to focus primarily on 
education and on keeping alive in the seminaries medieval Muslim theological and 
juristic doctrines. They saw politics as an unequal struggle and tried to be as 
independent as possible from the Indian-British state. Their anti-Britishness, however, 
took the form of withdrawal and non-cooperation, rather than of active confrontation, 
but they took great care to minimize not only British and Hindu influences, but also 
Shia. Nevertheless, and through active proselytization, they have built up a mass 
following as well as an international reputation in Islamic learning. This includes a 
global organization named Tabligh-i-Jamaat which is represented in Britain with 
headquarters in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, and which also has an active presence in 
Birmingham and London. The Barevis, in contrast, are more numerous across Britain 
DQGIRUPWKHFRUHIRUH[DPSOHRI%UDGIRUG¶V0XVOLPs, but are also part of a tradition 
of Sufi mysticism and Indian folk religion shared by a variety of British Muslim 
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communities. Deriving their name from Ahmed Riza Khan of Bareilly (1856-1921) 
theirs is an Islam of personalities; the Prophet Mohammed, for instance, is imbued 
with a metaphysical significance and devotional reverence that goes well beyond what 
some Muslims would regard as orthodox and which KDV EHHQ FDOOHG WKH ³WKH
P\VWLILFDWLRQRI ,VODP´40 Their religious heroes are not confined to the Prophet and 
the early Arab Muslims but include a galaxy of minor and major saints who, contrary 
to more reformist Islam, can intercede with God on behalf of petitioners. Additionally 
they hold dear many customs and superstitions that have no justification in the Qu¶ran 
but have been acquired from other sources.   
  
This heterogeneity of ethnic, national and theological cleavages has led Humuyan 
Ansari to insist that ³presumptions of Muslim homogeneity and coherence which 
claim to override the differences«do not necessarily correspond to social reality.41 A 
Sylheti from Bangladesh, apart from some tenets of faith, is likely to have little in 
common with a Mirpuri from Pakistan, let aloQHD6RPDOLRU%RVQLDQ0XVOLP´ This 
is supported E\ )UHG +DOOLGD\¶V FRQFHUQ WR IRFXV DQDO\VLV XSRQ ³WKH LQWHUVHFWLRQ RI
LGHQWLWLHV´VLQFH: 
[I]W LV HDV\ WR«VWXG\ DQ LPPLJUDQW FRPmunity and present all in terms of 
religion. But this is to miss other identities ± of work, location, ethnicity - and, 
not least, the ways in which different Muslims relate to each other. Anyone with 
the slightest acquaintance of the inner life of the Arabs in Britain, or the 
Pakistani and Bengali communities, will know there is as much difference as 
commonality.42   
  
Whilst these assessments are not without foundation, and should help counter an 
understanding of Muslims in Britain as a monolithic group, one of the arguments of 
this chapter is that certain concerns transcend Muslim difference ± particularly since 
the (albeit slim) majority of British-Muslims have not migrated to Britain but have 
been born here. Shared concerns are likely to encompass the ways in which to combat 
anti-Muslim racism, or cultivate a positive public image (heterogeneous or otherwise), 
or a desire amongst some Muslim parents to school their children in Islamic traditions 
and so on. One particular issue that this raises is whether a discernable British Muslim 
identity has given rise to a discernable µ0XVOLP YRWH¶ in Britain, for it is clear that 
Muslim organizations in the last general election campaigned on a distinctive equality 
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agenda that drew attention to the ways Muslims have become victims of the anti-
terrorism campaigns and related Islamophobia.43 If we continue with this example, a 
number of implications can be drawn from these developments that include 
differences between Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic minority voting patterns, as well 
as the extent to which 0XVOLPSROLWLFDOHOHFWRUDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLV³FORVHO\FRQQHFWHGWR
the size of the local Muslim population [which] indicates that registration, like 
turnout, is affected by the forces of [Muslim] PRELOLVDWLRQ´44 One example of 
Muslim electoral mobilization was much in evidence when the Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB) issued a ten point check card to encourage Muslim voters to evaluate 
YDULRXV SROLWLFLDQV¶ SRVLWLRQV RQ PDWWHUV FRQFHUQLQJ ERWK GRPHVWLF DQG IRUHLJQ
policy.45 The reception of such a strategy by a former leading Labour politician 
provides a lucid illustration of the electoral impact of attitudinal and social shifts 
amongst the contemporary Muslims of his former constituency: 
For more than 30 years, I took the votes RI%LUPLQJKDP0XVOLPVIRUJUDQWHG«
if, at any time between 1964 and 1997 I heard of a Khan, Saleem or Iqbal who 
GLGQRWVXSSRUW/DERXU,ZDVERWKRXWUDJHGDQGDVWRQLVKHG >«@7KH0XVOLP
YLHZRI/DERXUKDVFKDQJHG >«@$Q[LRXV LPPLJUDQWVZKR WKURZ WKHPVHOYes 
on the mercy of their members of parliament are now a minority. Their children 
and grandchildren will only vote for politicians who explicitly meet their 
GHPDQGV>«@,QIXWXUHWKH\ZLOOSLFNDQGFKRRVHEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHVDQGDVN
"What have you done for us?"46  
  
The central narrative running through this account is that of a confident British 
Muslim democratic engagement that is further illustrated by Sher Khan of the Muslim 
Council of Britain (MCB): 
Our position has always been that we see ourselves as part of this society. I do 
not think that you can be part of it if you are not willing to take part in electing 
your own representatives.  So, engage with the process of governance or of your 
community as part of being a citizen of this community. We think it is 
imperative.47 
 
This ethic of engagement has not been limited to electoral participation, however, for 
it is also observed in some key areas in which Muslims in Britain have secured forms 
of state recognition through processes of engagement and lobbying. This can include 
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the provision of mortgages compliant with Islamic approaches to saving and 
investing, and the operation of 6KDU¶LD law in civil matters more broadly. For 
example, the Islamic teaching that riba (usury or interest) is haram (forbidden) is a 
guiding tenet for some observant Muslims, but is made implausible by systems of 
financial products which either generate or charge interest. One alternative system 
which has organically developed in Britain includes an arrangement where banks buy 
properties on a customer's behalf but then sell it back to the customer with an 
additional charge equivalent to the total amount of interest. For some time, however, 
this incurred two sets of stamp duty (a tax which is payable to the government on the 
purchase of a house). This was until 2003 when the then Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Gordon Brown abolished this double charge, and since then the Council of Mortgage 
Lenders and MCB have continued to liaise with various government departments on 
how to make Islamic home finance products more viable in the UK.48   
  
This is one example of a successful accommodation of aspects of 6KDU¶LD even while 
6KDU¶LD councils themselves continue to be the subject of intense controversy.49 This 
was typified by the hysteria surrounding the present Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr 
5RZDQ:LOOLDPVZKRVHSXEOLFOHFWXUHRQ³What degree of accommodation the law of 
the land can and should give to minority communities with their own strongly 
entrenched legal and moral codeV´ZDVPHWZLWKDPedia frenzy. The lecture included 
D GHYHORSHG DQG KLJKO\ VHQVLWLYH UHIOHFWLRQ RQ WKH UHDOLW\ DQG SRWHQWLDO RI µSOXUDO
MXULVGLFWLRQ¶SDUWLFXODUO\LQUHODWLRQWRWKHH[SHULHQFHRIDQGGLVFXVVLRQVDERXWVKDU¶LD
courts, their capacity to rule on such matters as family disputes and claims, and their 
UHODWLRQVKLSWRWKH³VWDWXWRU\ODZRIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP´50 What the media reaction 
to his lecture ignored was how since the 1970s some marital and inheritance disputes 
have been judged in Muslim arbitration boards if both parties have freely consented to 
such adjudication, and this has taken place under the broader remit of English civil 
law.  Where the application of 6KDU¶LD has contravened English civil law it has been 
rejected by the courts, as Pearl and Menski¶V otherwise critical account of British 
traditions of positive law details: 
>7@KH %ULWLVK OHJDO V\VWHP ZLWK LWV SRVLWLYLVW DSSURDFK WR ZKDW ³ODZ´ LV DQG
what it is not, remains purposely blind to social conventions and so-called 
³FXOWXUDO SUDFWLFHV´ ZKLFK are perceived to operate in the 'extra-legal' sphere.  
This fictitious, dismissive yet reluctantly tolerant attitude has in fact allowed 
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VSDFHIRUWKHXQRIILFLDOGHYHORSPHQWRIQHZK\EULGUXOHV«$WWKHVDPHWLPH
the official legal system can afford, from a position of superiority, to keep the 
OHJDO SRVLWLRQ RI %ULWLVK 0XVOLPV XQGHU QHJRWLDWLRQ« LQ HIIHFW WKH\ DUH
following a path which they FRQVLGHU DSSURSULDWH « D QHZ K\EULG IRUP RI
6KDU¶LD, which avoids breaking the official law of their new home.51 
  
The ambiguities of this scenario are perhaps most graphically illustrated in the 
machinations of the Islamic 6KDU¶LD Council (ISC), an affiliate of the MCB, and one 
of the most prominent examples of the ways in which British Muslims are using the 
framework of the 6KDU¶LD to resolve disputes while remaining within the bounds of 
British laws. This council was founded in 1982 and emerged from attempts by a 
group of London imams to resolve issues of conflict between British and 6KDU¶LD 
law.52 It consists of a bench of jurists who provide a conciliation service for disputing 
couples and authoritative religious legal opinions on a host of social and economic 
matters raised by individuals and organizations. According to Yilmaz, the council 
takes a pragmatic approach by allowing applicants to choose a particular school of 
law and are offered legal guidance and resolution of conflicts on the basis of its 
perspective.53 
 
The Muslim Addition to British Multi-Faithism 
 
It is argued that examples of such hybrid religious-civic engagement can be drawn 
from Britain¶V PXOWL-faith history. For while the ISC is yet to receive official 
recognition on a par with that afforded to Jewish Beth Din courts, for example, it is 
already viewed by many British Muslims as a relevant means of reconciling their 
legal and spiritual needs. Indeed, what the Jewish example re-iterates is that British 
Muslim engagement with the state proceeds in a context that is characterized by an 
internal religious plurality which has been supplemented by the migration of different 
religious groups over the last two centuries.54 To be sure, and in spite of maintaining a 
Protestant Established Church of England, the superior status of the dominant 
Anglican Church has consistently been challenged by other Christian denominations, 
not least in Scotland where the religious majority is not Anglican but Presbyterian, 
and which led to the creation of a Church of Scotland. Elsewhere in England and 
Wales, Protestant nonconformists have been vocal; and issues such as education have 
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LQWKHSDVWHQFRXUDJHGPDQ\RIWKHVHJURXSVWR³VWDQGRXWDJDLQVWWKHVWDWHIRUJLYLQJ
every opportunity to the Church of England to proselytize through the education 
system,´55 The cycles of 19th century migration from Ireland to London, Glasgow, 
and the north of England have considerably expanded the Roman Catholic presence in 
Britain. The turn of the 20th century, meanwhile, witnessed the arrival of destitute 
Jewish migrants fleeing both the pogroms and the economic deprivation in Russia.56 
Both groups have suffered racial discrimination and civil disabilities on the basis of 
their religious affiliation but in due course have come to enjoy some of the benefits 
LQLWLDOO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK µHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶WKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKH&KXUFKRI(QJODQG
with the British state). This includes allowing the Catholic Church to set up schools 
alongside the state and then, in the 1944 Education Act, to opt into the state sector and 
receive similar provisions to those enjoyed by members of the established Church; a 
provision which was soon extended to other religious groups, notably Jewish 
minorities.   
  
Muslims then, like Hindus and Sikhs, are the most recent and numerically significant 
addition to this plurality to have established themselves, with varying degrees of 
VXFFHVV DV SDUW RI WKH ³QHZ FXOWXUDO ODQGVFDSH´ RI %ULWDLQ.57 This is evidenced is 
several spheres but is made strikingly visible in what Peach and Gale describe as the 
³QHZ µFDWKHGUDOV¶ RI WKH (QJOLVK FXOWXUDO ODQGVFDSH´58 By this they refer to the 
creation of Muslim masjids, alongside Hindu mandirs and Sikh gurdwaras, that have 
emerged though a process of dialogue between minority faith groups and British city 
planning authorities. One of several points of interest in the creation of these places of 
worship, is that out of the thousand or so that exist, the majority are in fact 
conversions of disused chapels, churches, and other such premises.59 In this context it 
is not surprising to learn mosque building less controversial in Britain as it may be 
elsewhere on the continent, since Muslims frequently use the 1852 and 1855 Places of 
Worship Registration Acts, though securing planning permission to function as a 
place of worship or education (or both) under the Town and Country Planning Act 
1971 is never straightforward (while registration is not a legal requirement, planning 
permission is). Similar historical settlements explain religious burial accommodations. 
For example, the Local Authorities Cemeteries Order 1977 empowers burial 
authorities to set aside any part of a cemetery that has not been consecrated for use by 
a religious denomination. As Ansari (forthcoming) elaborates:  
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Many local authorities have responded to the expressed needs and wishes of 
Muslims to be able to carry out burials soon after death, and so changes have 
been made to registry office opening hours and weekend burials are carried out 
on request in some areas. >«@ Coventry City Council has made provisions for 
Muslims to carry out the actual burial themselves if it is required at a weekend 
or on a Bank Holiday. Some burial grounds have ensured that there are specific 
sections for Muslims to be buried, and that the grounds are appropriately laid 
out. Accommodation has been made by some to comply with Muslim 
requirements to bury the body without a coffin.  
  
An example of the latter includes Slough Borough Council which promises to carry 
out burials within hours of receipt of the necessary completed paperwork. Similar 
such accommodations may be found in the provision of Halal meat - for while it has 
long been a legal requirement for animals to be µstunned¶ RU SDUWLDOO\ XQFRQVFLRXV 
prior to slaughter, exemptions have been made for the Jewish practice of Shechita, 
and these were extended to the Muslim practice of Dhabh, through the Slaughter of 
Poultry Act 1967 and Slaughterhouses Act 1974. One of the most prominent 
examples of Muslim-state engagement across both multiculturalist and religious 
pluralist traditions is to be found in the Muslim mobilizations for Muslim schools.60 
In this area Muslim groups achieved a watershed in 1998 when, after eighteen years 
RID&RQVHUYDWLYHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQDµ1HZ/DERXU¶JRYHUQPHQWGHOLYHUHGRQDSURPLVH
in its election manifesto and co-opted two Muslim schools, Islamia School (in Brent, 
London) and Al-Furqan School (in Birmingham), into the state sector by awarding 
each Voluntary Aided (VA) status. This status prescribed an allocation of public 
money to cover teacher salaries and the running costs of the school. It arrived 
³IRXUWHHQ \HDUV DQG ILYH 6HFUHWDULHV RI 6WDWH DIWHU WKH ILUVW QDLYH DSSURDFK´ ZKHQ
Muslim parents and educators had only begun to get to grips with the convoluted 
application process to achieve state funding, and were dealing with a Conservative 
government that was hostile to the idea of state funded Muslim schools.61 Eleven 
years and another five Secretaries of State later, the number of state-funded Muslim 
faith schools has risen to eight. In addition to those above, this figure includes Al-
Hijrah (a secondary school in Birmingham), Feversham College (a secondary school 
in Bradford), Gatton Primary School (in Wandsworth, South London), Tauheedul 
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Islam Girls High School (Blackburn, Lancashire) and The Avenue School (another 
primary school in Brent, London).  
 
Overarching Structural and Cultural Factors 
 
One salient structural factor shaping the experiences of Muslim minorities in 
contemporary Britain surrounds their over-concentration in particular localities where 
they constitute the main minorities i.e. particular regions of Northern towns. These 
areas of early Muslim settlements were focused around older, industrial towns where 
the initial wave of male labourers had arrived to take up work. Outside London, other 
areas of settlement comprise both the east and west Midlands (Blackburn, Leicester, 
Birmingham); South and West Yorkshire (Sheffield, Leeds, Dewsbury and Bradford), 
and Greater Manchester (including Oldham and Burnley). It has been argued that a 
contemporary concentration in such settlement patterns has given rise to dualistic and 
polarizing interactions. For example, while chair of the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE), Trevor Phillips (later chair of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC)) LQVLVWHGWKDW%ULWDLQZDVµVOHHSZDONLQJ¶LQWRD8.S.-VW\OHµKDUG
VHJUHJDWLRQ¶ in FODLPLQJ WKDW ³5HVLGHQWLDOO\ VRPH GLVWULFWV DUH RQ WKHLU ZD\ WR
becoming fully fledged ghettos ² black holes into which no one goes without fear 
DQGWUHSLGDWLRQDQGIURPZKLFKQRRQHHYHUHVFDSHVXQGDPDJHG´62   
  
In promoting this view Phillips has not gone unchallenged. Amongst others the 
demographers Finney and Simpson have shown that the number of mixed 
neighbourhoods (measured in electoral wards) has actually increased rather than 
decreased in recent times (from 964 to 1,070) in the period between the most recent 
and second most recent decennial census.63 In shaping a broader pattern of dispersal 
rather than concentration, Finney and Simpson insist that there will be at least 1,300 
mixed neighbourhoods by the next census in 2011 (one in five throughout England 
and Wales).64 2Q 3KLOOLSV¶ PRUH VSHFLILF FKDUJH they remind us that there is not a 
single ward in Britain in which the population is 100 percent ethnic minority, and that 
the proportion of ethnic minorities amounting to as much as 50 percent of the 
population of a neighbourhood was around 22 percent. They have shown that there 
are only 14 out of over 8,850 electoral wards in England and Wales in which an 
ethnic minority group makes up over half the population, and that in none does a 
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single ethnic minority account for over three quarters of the population. In contrast 
there are about 5,000 wards that are 98 percent white. Contrary to Phillips, it could be 
argued that where there are concentrations of ethnic minorities this is a result of 
population growth, rather than increasing segregation, particularly since Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi groups have younger age profiles. Moreover, it is of course common 
amongst many experiences of migration that people establish themselves in localities 
that allow for the sharing of resources and a general feeling of security, before social 
mobility facilitates a move outward.65 The important structural component that is too 
frequently absent from this discussion is the change that takes place around such 
minorities, and which is no more reducible to minority cultural features than the 
structural elements that invited initial settlement.   
  
$ SDUWLFXODUO\ VWDUN VWUXFWXUDO FRPSRQHQW VKDSLQJ WKH OLYHV RI %ULWDLQ¶V 0XVOLP
minorities is their socioeconomic profile which is significantly lower than their 
counterparts. For example, Abrams and Houston found that Muslims have 
disproportionately lower incomes and higher rates of unemployment, and that they 
have comparatively lower skills both in education and in vocational training.66 
Muslim minorities are also more likely to reside in deprived housing and 
disproportionately suffer from bad health.67 This is illustrated by the finding that 68 
percent of Bangladeshi households live below the poverty line and about 40 percent 
of Muslim children in London live in poverty.68 It has, however, been argued that 
these features are in truth an ethnic phenomenon rather than a religious one since non-
Pakistani and non-Bangladeshi Muslims such as Indians and African-Asians fair 
much better according to these indices. What this ignores is that while ethnic origin 
analyses shows significant variations across Muslim groups, and demonstrate that not 
all Muslim ethnic groups are equally disadvantaged, the most disadvantaged groups 
mainly consist of Muslim ethnic groups e.g., Muslims with an Indian background will 
perform less well than Hindus with an Indian background.69 The outcome as a whole 
is that Muslims minorities represent a much weaker group in the labour market and 
Muslims as a whole have an increased reliance on state benefits, and so forth.  
  
One important factor related to this could be deemed cultural and has to do with the 
greater levels of non-participation of Muslim women in the labour market. For 
example, according to the last Census only around 28 percent of Pakistani women and 
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22 percent percent of Bangladeshi women are in employment.70 One of the most 
frequent explanations of this trend is to attribute it to a lack of suitable qualifications 
and educational training. It is significant then to note a counter-cyclical trend which 
reports that over the last decade Pakistani and Bangladeshi girls have become more 
OLNHO\ WKDQ ER\V WR DFKLHYH  *&6(¶V DW JUDGHV $-C.71 This is not something 
limited to tertiary education for, according to Bagguley and Hussein, while the past 
WZRGHFDGHVKDV VHHQDJHQHUDOH[SDQVLRQRISDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQKLJKHU HGXFDWLRQ³WKH
increasing participation of South Asian women, especially those of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi origin, hDV VXUSDVVHG DOO H[SHFWDWLRQV´72 This includes a leap in the 
percentages of women entering university between 1979 to 2000 with Pakistani 
ethnicities from 1.7 to 14.5 percent, and for the same period for women of 
Bangladeshi ethnicity from 1.6 to 12.5 percent.73 In broad terms, this might be 
explained by migrant attitudes toward success in which ethnic minority cultural 
dynamics serve a positive function. 7KLV LQFOXGHV KRZ ³SDUHQWV RWKHU VLJQLILFDQW
relatives and community members share some general, but durable, ambitions to 
achieve upward mobility for themselves and especially for their children and believe 
that (higher) education is important in achieving those ambitions, and so prioritize the 
acquisition of (higher) education,´74   
 
State - Muslim Engagement Around Terrorism 
 
Perhaps the most novel and least charted present area of state-Muslim engagement, 
however, surrounds issues concerning the prevention of terrorism and violent 
extremism. Following the London bombings in July 2005, the government created 
seven working groups75 comprised of representatives of Muslim communities under 
WKH WHUPV µ3UHYHQWLQJ ([WUHPLVP 7RJHWKHU¶ 3(7 7KRXJK LQLWLDWHG E\ WKH +RPH
Office, this would later fall under the remit of the subsequently created Department 
for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).   
  
These working groups devised a series of proposals to develop practical means of 
tackling violent extremism. Sixty-four recommendations were put forward in a report 
published in November 2005, with a particular emphasis on three that could act as 
central planks of unfolding government strategies concerned with preventing violent 
extremism.  These constitutedILUVWO\WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDµ6FKRODUV5RDGVKRZ¶OHG
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by British Muslim organizDWLRQV ZKHUH µLQIOXHQWLDO PDLQVWUHDP¶ 0XVOLP WKLQNHUV
would speak to audiences of young British Muslims. The rationale behind this was 
that these speakers would distil effective arguments against extremist justification for 
terrorism in denouncing it as un-Islamic, VR DV WR ³FRXQWHU WKH LGHRORJLFDO DQG
theological underpinnLQJV RI WKH WHUURULVW QDUUDWLYH´76 This included a variety of 
international figures, and two high-profile Muslim intellectuals to take part and 
remain committed to this strategy were the Swiss-born Francophone scholar, Tariq 
Ramadan, and the American convert Hamza Yusuf Hanson.   
  
A second proposed plank concerned the creation of Muslim forums against extremism 
and Islamophobia. These could be led by key individuals and bring together members 
of local Muslim communities, law enforcement and public service agencies to discuss 
how to tackle extremism and Islamophobia in their area. The third and perhaps most 
longstanding recommendation, in terms of proposed structural capacity building 
within British Muslim communities, promoted the formation of a Mosques and Imams 
National Advisory Board (MINAB). To this end, a steering group of Muslim leaders 
has undertaken an extensive national consultation on matters such as the accreditation 
of imams, better governance of mosques, and interfaith activity.77 Alongside this 
SURIHVVLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWSURJUDPPHRU³XS-VNLOOLQJ´RILPDPVDQGPRVTXHRIILFLDOV
recommendations were also made for a national campaign and coalition to increase 
the visibility of Muslim women, and to specifically empower and equip them in the 
course of becoming active citizens.   
  
The provenance of these working groups and their recommendations rests in a broader 
strategy which the British government had been cumulatively developing since the 
events of 9/11. Known as CONTEST, this broad-ranging counter-terrorism strategy 
was launched in 2003 and comprised of four components concerned with meeting the 
objectives of Pursuit (to stop terrorist attacks); Preparedness (to mitigate their impact 
where they cannot be stopped); Protection (to strengthen overall protection against 
terrorist attacks), and Prevention (to stop people from becoming terrorists or 
supporting violent extremists). It is this last objective that was given added impetus 
upon the news that British Muslims had planned and carried out the London 
bombings, and it is the objective that has most overtly sought the interactive 
involvement of British Muslim communities at large. It is therefore unsurprising to 
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learn that a strategy premised upon entering, and to some extent reformulating, the 
life worlds of British Muslim communities has been the subject of critical debate in 
the study of ethnic relations more broadly.78 That this intention was salient could be 
gleaned from the fact that immediately after the London bombing, the Home Office 
signalled that it would establish The Commission on Integration and Cohesion 
&2,& ³WR DGYLVH RQ KRZ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKHLU RZQ UHOLJLRQ DQG FXOWXUH WKHUH LV
EHWWHULQWHJUDWLRQRIWKRVHSDUWVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\LQDGHTXDWHO\LQWHJUDWHG´79  
  
In this way the Prevent strategy signals some diffusion of formal responsibilities for 
policy implementation and service delivery in a way that some perceive as indicative 
RI EURDGHU GHYHORSPHQW LQ µJRYHUQDQFH¶ SUDFWLFHV ZKHUHE\ ³UHVSRQVLELOLW\ DQG
accountability for a wide range of social issues is increasingly focused towards local 
levels, whilst at the same time centralised control in terms of resources and target-
VHWWLQJLVPDLQWDLQHG´.80 While not immediately apparent in the earlier quotation, the 
incorporation too of faith-based groups from within the third sector is potentially part 
of a novel approach of engaging with religious minorities through the practices and 
models of representation, stakeholders, and advocacy in the consultative arena.81 
What this discussion is trying to elaborate on is the manner in which the Prevent 
agenda, in constituting part of the broad counter-terrorism strategy, appears to be 
simultaneously subject to at least two broader prevailing dynamics comprising: 
«the implementation of anti-terrorist laws that can be used disproportionately 
against Muslims leading to the potential for their increased surveillance and 
FRQWURODQGWKHUHE\VHUYLQJWRUHGXFH0XVOLPV¶WUXVWRIVWDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVZKLOH
at the same time pursuing approaches that acknowledge, and stress the 
LPSRUWDQFHRI WKH LQYROYHPHQWRI%ULWLVK«0XVOLPFRPPXQLWLHV LQKHOSLQJ WR
combat extremism.82   
  
Indeed, Spalek and Imoual IUDPHWKHVHG\QDPLFVUHODWLRQDOO\LQWHUPVRI³KDUGHU´DQG
³VRIWHU´ VWUDWHJLHV RI HQJDJHPHQW ZKHUHE\ WKH IRUPHU PD\ EH XQGerstood as 
consisting of various means of surveillance, policing and intelligence gathering, and 
so on.83 The latter, meanwhile, would include the development of dialogue, 
participation and community feedback between Muslim communities, state agencies 
and voluntary organizations in a way that may serve to increase trust in ³the battle for 
hearts and minds´. For example, the Prevent strategy emphasises, and seeks to extend 
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to Muslims long-established equality traditions historically orientated toward ethnic 
and racial minorities: 
  
The Prevent strategy requires a specific response, but we must also make the most of 
the links with wider community work to reduce inequalities, tackle racism and other 
forms of extremism (e.g. extreme far right), build cohesion and empower 
FRPPXQLWLHV>«@/LNHZLVHLWLVUHFRJQLVHGWKDWWKHDUJXPHQWVRIYLROHQWH[WUHPLVWV
ZKLFKUHO\RQFUHDWLQJDµWKHP¶DQGDQµXV¶DUHOHVVOLNHO\WRILQGWraction in cohesive 
communities.84 
  
This builds upon recognition within government policies and legislation of Muslim 
religious difference that has been manifested in other ways, including measures 
against religious discrimination as set out in the Equality Act 2010. The tensions, 
then, surround the extent to which the prevailing British citizenship being extended to 
Muslims²through social and community cohesion agendas²are twinned with or 
placed within the same register as anti/counter-terrorism strategies that import or rely 
upon certain securitizHGµKDUG¶DVSHFWVRIWKLVGLPHQVLRQRIstate-Muslim engagement.  
The risk is that Muslim active citizenship is to some extent framed in terms of 
demonstrable counter-terrorism activities, in a way which assumes that Muslim 
FRPPXQLWLHVDWODUJHUHPDLQWKH³ORFXVRIWKHLVVXHRIH[WUHPLVP´85  The most recent 
report from the 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V 7DVN )RUFH RQ Tackling Radicalisation and 
Extremism (2013) continues to reflects many of these same tensions in surmising that 
YLROHQW H[WUHPLVP µLV D GLVWLQFW LGHRORJ\ ZKLFK VKRXOG QRW EH FRQIXVHG ZLWK
traditional religLRXVSUDFWLFH¶SDQGWKDWµextremism is less likely to be tolerated 
by communities which come together to challenge it. Britain is stronger because of its 
open, multi-faith and multi- racial communities, which can tackle extremists together 
and challenge the view that it is not possible to be a true Muslim and be integrated in 
British society¶S 
  
British Muslim Citizenship and the Re-Balancing of Multiculturalism 
 
What these examples begin to illustrate is that the state of multiculturalism in Britain 
does not mirror the ³GUDVWLF EUHDN ZLWK PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP´ recently made by the 
Dutch.86 This has seen the Netherlands discontinue some emblematic multiculturalist 
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policies while introducing others specifically tailored to ignore ethnic minority 
differences. This includes the large-scale abandonment of dual-citizenship 
programmes; a withdrawal of national-level funding for minority group organizations 
and activities supporting cultural difference; reallocating the small percentage of 
public broadcasting time dedicated to multicultural issues; a proposed banning of the 
wearing of the burka in public places through an act of parliament; and a cessation of 
ethnic monitoring of labour market participation.87 1HLWKHU GRHV LW FRQILUP )DYHOO¶V
insistence that:  
[O]ur tried-and-tested narratives and models of postwar immigration in 
Europe²the standard discussions of immigration, integration and citizenship, 
based on post-colonial, guestworker and asylum models, and historical 
distinctions between pre- and post-1973 trends²are finished.88 
  
In contrast, what has been taking place in Britain is more like a movement from a 
perceived neglect to affirmation RIµ%ULWLVKQHVV¶SUHVHQWHGDVDPHWD-membership with 
which all, including Muslim minorities and non-Muslim majorities, should engage. 
For example, the government-endorsed report entiWOHG µ$ -RXUQH\ WR &LWL]HQVKLS¶ 
chaired by the late Sir Bernard Crick has characterized Britishness as denoting    
«UHVSHFW >IRU@ WKH ODZV WKH HOHFWHG SDUOLDPHQWDU\ DQG GHPRFUDWLF SROLWical 
structures, traditional values of mutual tolerance, respect for equal rights and 
mutual concern... To be British is to respect those over-arching specific 
institutions, values, beliefs and traditions that bind us all, the different nations and 
cultures together in peace and in a legal order. [...] So to be British does not mean 
assimilation into a common culture so that original identities are lost.89     
  
As his report recommending the introduction of citizenship education put it, part of 
the groundswHOO IRU LWV UHFHQW HPHUJHQFH LV XQGRXEWHGO\ D VHQVH RI ³FLYLF GHILFLW´
epitomizHG E\ YRWHU DSDWK\ DPRQJVW \RXQJ SHRSOH ZKLFK WKH UHSRUW FODLPV ³LV
LQH[FXVDEO\EDGDQGVKRXOGDQGFRXOGEHUHPHGLHG´90 To this end the QCA, under 
the commission chaired by Crick, recommended the implementation of a co-ordinated 
national strategy for the statutory requirement for schools to spend around 5 percent 
of their curriculum time teaching three interdependent elements of citizenship 
education. These would comprise (i) social and moral responsibility, (ii) community 
involvement, and (iii) political literacy. 
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While these reiterate elements of the Swann Commission, they perhaps also constitute 
a modification of earlier approaches. Though WKH4&$LQVLVWHGXSRQUHVSHFWIRU³Whe 
plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities, and religions long established in the 
8.´ there is no explicit reference to anti-racism which confirmed to some that 
citizenship education represents a disengagement from these issues.91 Osler and 
Starkey92 IRU H[DPSOH FKDUJH WKH 4&$ UHSRUW ZLWK ³LQVWLWXWLRQDO UDFLVP´ IRU
GHPDQGLQJWKDW³PLQRULWLHVPXVWOHDUQWRUHVSHFWWKHODZVFRGHVDQGFRQYHQWLRQVDV
PXFK DV WKH PDMRULW\´93 7KLV WKH\ WDNH DV HYLGHQFH RI D ³FRORQLDO DSSURDFK«WKDW
runs throughout the UHSRUW´ DQG ZKLFK ³IDOOV LQWR WKH WUDS RI WUHDWLQJ FHUWDLQ
HWKQLFLWLHV DV µ2WKHU¶ ZKHQ LW GLVFXVVHV FXOWXUDO GLYHUVLW\´94 Sir Bernard Crick 
repudiates the view that his committee singled out minorities, saying that 
Were not willing to give the public the view that the major thrust of 
FLWL]HQVKLS ZDV UDFH UHODWLRQV :H VDLG GDPQ LW LW¶V DERXW WKH ZKROH
SRSXODWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ WKH PDMRULW\«SXSLOV VKRXOG OHDUQ UHVSHFW DQG KDYH
knowledge of national, regional ethnic and religious differences. We were 
simply takiQJ D EURDGHU YLHZ :H WKRXJKW WKDW«DOO RXU QDWLRQV¶ FKLOGUHQ
should receive an education that would help them to become active citizens: 
all RXUQDWLRQV¶FKLOGUHQ95 
  
7KLV QHHG QRW EH HYLGHQFH RI DQ DVVLPLODWRU\ ³UHWUHDW´ IURP DQWL-racism or 
multiculturalism, however, but something that might be characterizHG DV D ³UH-
EDODQFLQJ´ RI EURDGHU GLVFRXUVHV RI DQWL-racism and multiculturalism. Indeed, the 
HQWLUH LGHD RI ³FLWL]HQVKLS HGXFDWLRQ´ LV LQ LWVHOI VXUHO\ HYLGHQFH RI WKLV. While the 
latter point is welcomed by some commentators who had previously formed part of 
the pluralistic or anti-racist left identified earlier, the bringing of previously 
marginalized groups into the societal mainstream is, at best, greeted more 
ambivalently.96  It is difficult, however, not to view this as a knee-jerk reaction that 
condemns religious identities per se, rather than examining them on a case-by-case 
basis, while at the same time assuming that ethnic identities are free of illiberal goals. 
This is empirically problematic given that clitoridectomy, for instance, is an example 
of a cultural practice among various ethnic groups and yet has little support from any 
religion. So to favour ethnicity and problematize religion is a reflection of a secularist 
bias that has alienated many religionists, especially Muslims, from multiculturalism. 
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,WLVPXFKEHWWHUWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWWKHµPXOWL¶LQPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVPZLOOHQFRPSDVV
different kinds of groups and does not itself privilege any one kind, but that 
µUHFRJQLWLRQ¶ VKRXOG EH JLYHQ WR the identities that marginalized groups themselves 




This chapter has charted the contemporary structural and cultural dynamics informing 
relationships between British Muslim identity articulations and the state. Traversing 
DUHDVRISROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQREVHUYDQFHRIDVSHFWVRI6KDU¶LDLQSHUVRQDODQGFLYLO
matters, spatial settlement and educational social mobility, and community 
consultation in preventing violent extremism, the chapter has elaborated how 
UHVSRQVHV WR 0XVOLP µGLIIHUHQFH¶ LQ %ULWDLQ GHWDLO D SDWWHUQ RI HQJDJHPHQW WKDW KDV
evolved over a period of time through both race-equality and multi-faith opportunity 
structures. In a cumulative way, developments in each have come to characterize a 
British multiculturalism that has, contrary to popular insistence following the London 
bombings, not been erased. As such we contend that any discussion of Muslim 
minorities in 21st century Britain must not ignore these developments for they too may 
affect the course of future state-Muslim engagement ± a point worth stressing as we 
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